Why do third party experiments continue to fail in Punjab?

By Harjeshwar Pal Singh | OPINION |

A political party is an organisation which intends to capture political power. Most political systems especially democracies have political parties competing for power. However creating a political party is a fiendishly difficult task to perform. Parties need favourable circumstances, leadership, organisation, programmes, agitations, resources, members, etc to stuck root, grow and eventually bring in a political bumper crop. In practice most gets uprooted much before that.

Punjabs politics for long has been dominated by two parties — Congress and Akali Dal. Since the 80s SAD (Mann), Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), Balwant Ramoovalia’s Lok Bhalai Party (LBP) Manpreet Badal’s Peoples Party of Punjab (PPP), Delhi-based Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), Sukhpal Khehra led Punjab democratic alliance (PDA) etc have tried to challenge the duopoly but have fallen short and as the 2022 election arrives in 6 months it seems as if it would again be Congress vs Akali. What explains this failure of the third front to emerge in Punjab despite a substantial sentiment of change and support among the voters?

In my view there are a number of reasons for it:

1. First Past the Post System: In democracies with the first past the post system where the political party which receives the maximum votes wins, in practice only the two strongest are taken seriously by the voters due to a fear that there vote might not go waste. As a result the third party is at an inherent disadvantage of being perceived weak and often gets decimated at polls. This is what happened to Manpreet’s PPP in 2012.

2. Dominance of Bigger Parties: The big two of Punjab Politics — Congress and SAD —are formidable parties. They are present in the whole state, in each village and Mohalla. They have deep pockets, established leadership and workers and dedicated vote-banks of 25-30% which stand by them even in the worst circumstances. Also they are like two monopolistic platforms who can buy or browbeat any new political startup. This can be done through co-option — Manpreet, Ramoovalia, Khaira or by putting up cases against the new wannabes, causing them financial losses or harassing their supporters .

3. Weaknesses of third front Parties: New Parties are often far weaker than the older ones. They are plagued by a number of problems.

• Feeble Organisations — Most new parties have weak organisations and are absent from large parts of the state. Organisations fill rallies, provide political goods to voters and ensure voter turnout at booths. Compared to SAD and Congress which have network of workers in every nook and corner of the state LBP, AAP and PPP all were mainly present in some parts of Malwa, BSP in Doaba, etc. AAP hardly bothered to create an organisation putting its belief in creating waves through social media alone.

• Lack of resources — Small third front parties lack the deep pockets and resources of Congress and Akalis and struggle to compete except in “wave“ elections like 1989 and 2014. Lack of resources often lead outfits like PPP and AAP to incorporate “puraane Purze” from Congress and Alkalis diluting their appeal.

• Narrow Social base — Another problem of third alternatives in the state is their narrow social base. Unlike Congress and Akalis which are “catch all” parties catering to all social groups in all parts of the state, parties like BSP mainly caters to the Dalits and SAD (Maan) to radical Sikhs. LBP had its base mainly among NRI’s and in rural pockets of Ludhiana and Sangrur. AAP the largest among them all ultimately ended up mainly as a Malwa-based party.

• Overbearing Centralisation — The future of some third alternatives in Punjab like BSP and AAP were scuttled by their high commands who vary of state based leadership ruthlessly purged inner party democracy and leadership showing initiative and independence.

4. Led by Power Centric Conventional elite Politicians: One persistent problem of new Punjab alternatives are that most of them are led by power centric conventional politicians who use ideology and rhetoric only as tool to capture power (Maan is one notable exception). These elite politicians are unable to form teams and show antipathy to organisation formation. They rely far more on social media gimmicks than street level agitations. They quickly lose heart after a debacle and readily jump onto an established platform. Manpreet Badal, Sukhpal Khaira, Simranjit Bains are some notable examples of this trend.

5. Role of NRIs: All recent third wave experiments in Punjab have seen overwhelming support of NRI’s. NRIs support has been crucial for resources, volunteers and over social media and providing immediate traction to a party but they also tend to steer the parties to mirror NRI social base and World view ie Rural Jatt Sikh dominance and taking up of Sikh issues which ensures that these new outfits are pushed into a corner and support of other crucial element of Punjab Politics — Urban Hindus, Dalits etc gets muted.

6. Non Party Civil Society: Most political parties have emerged from social struggles and social movements. Punjab has a formidable section of farmers unions which has gained strength in the last few years. They have a lot of things needed for a third alternative —Credible leadership, organisations, dedicated cadres, programmes and ability to fight on the streets. However most of them do not participate directly in electoral politics, further handicapping the quest for a third alternative.

Any viable third front in the state needs a number of vital ingredients which include credible leadership, organisation, resources, clear programmes, dedicated and trained cadres, large social base and an ability to patiently wage a long and patient fight. At the moment all these seems to be in short supply in Punjab despite a strong popular urge for change.

Harjeshwar Pal Singh is an assistant professor at Sri Guru Gobind Singh College, Chandigarh, where he teaches history. He is an avid political commentator.

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